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Zhengyu: Toward “Land” or toward “Sea”?

Toward “L and” or toward “Sea”?
The High-Speed Railway and China’s Grand Strategy
Wu Zhengyu

C

hina’s maritime development having come up against pressures and challenges in recent years, the concept of “strategic hedging”—that is, pursuit
of and investment in policies meant to protect the nation against the effects of
geopolitical and economic uncertainty—has emerged. One of its most important
proponents is Gao Bai, an ethnic Chinese professor of sociology at Duke University (in Durham, North Carolina) and the author of the article “The High-Speed
Railway and China’s Grand Strategy in the 21st Century” (高铁与中国21世纪大
战略).1 Professor Gao believes that the 2008 global financial crisis and the return,
through its own strategic adjustment, of the United States to the Asia-Pacific region mean that China’s “blue-water strategy” has come to an end. The financial
crisis severely battered China’s export market, which will be difficult to restore
even after the crisis has subsided. America’s return to the Asia-Pacific region has
not only complicated China’s situation in its own neighborhood but made East
Asian economic integration more difficult to achieve. As Professor Gao points
out, because China’s economic transformation
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more favorable position for China in the global arena. Professor Gao stresses
that such a project, a land/sea hybrid in nature, offers a measure of freedom of
strategic choice: if a problem arises on the maritime front, China can develop
westward and dedicate itself to the integration of Eurasian economies; if difficulties emerge on the Eurasian landmass, China can turn eastward, dedicating
itself to the integration of Asian-Pacific economies. It is no exaggeration to say
that the importance of Professor Gao’s article is on a level well beyond that of a
high-speed rail in itself. The strategy that he advocates is essentially related not
only to China’s present dilemma but at the same time to China’s strategic choices
into the foreseeable future.
There is no doubt that, China at the moment being under intense pressure, the
hedging strategy that Professor Gao proposes is highly appealing. If this proposition really comes to fruition, for quite some time China will no doubt enjoy the
enviable position of having the best of both worlds on the global political and
economic stage. But the problem is that while Professor Gao’s article is principally
based on the usefulness of the high-speed rail in integrating the economy of the
Chinese mainland, this proposal is not as feasible as it seems at first glance; also,
and more importantly, even if it were realizable, it would not help China escape
its present conundrum. In modern history, the emergence and development of the
railway has indeed played an important role in increasing the power of continental
countries vis-à-vis maritime countries. However, this does not mean that we must
see the importance of the railway as unquestionable. In actuality, though more
than a hundred years have passed since the emergence of the railway, the Chinese
“heartland” mentioned by Professor Gao (he borrowed it from Halford Mackinder’s
Democratic Ideals and Reality) is still a relatively backward region. Since there
exists no substantial “generation gap” between the high-speed rail and its existing
precursor, the modern railway, it is highly doubtful whether the high-speed rail
really has the force to “integrate the economies of the Eurasian landmass.”
An even more important question is, Can the continental strategy with the
economic integration of the Eurasian landmass as the core really live up to the
strategic utility to which Gao refers? The answer to this involves three issues.
First, can the continental strategy help China sidestep strategic contradictions
and conflicts between China and America? Second, as a pillar in the economic
integration of the Eurasian landmass, what impact will the high-speed rail have
on Sino-Russian relations? Third, what are the possible strategic impacts of great
Chinese inroads into Central Asia? In view of Professor Gao’s proposed strategy
relating to the direction of China’s long-term development, it is necessary to
explore and analyze systematically the wisdom of his hedging strategy and on
this basis strive to clarify what path China should take in response to maritime
pressure.2
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The Continental Strategy and American Strategic
Misgivings about China
The first problem inherent in Professor Gao’s “hedging strategy” is doubt as to
whether the continental strategy, with the integration of the Eurasian economies
as its core element, will actually lessen the current strategic contradictions and
conflicts between China and the United States. The key to the answer lies mainly
in America’s strategic interests, as well as in the contradictory nature of presentday Sino-American strategic conflicts.
As was once true for Great Britain, the position of America in the world today
as the dominant maritime power and system leader stands primarily on two
pillars. One is the balance of power on the Eurasian landmass core (Europe and
East Asia), and the other is global economic, technological, and military superiority. In the history of the modern world, the system leader has been without
exception the leading maritime power of the era, and aside from economic,
technological, and military superiority, the preservation of a balance of power in
the core regions of the Eurasian landmass has always been an important means
by which the system leader has maintained its power advantage or supremacy.3
First, once a single power achieves hegemony in the Eurasian landmass core, it
automatically gets hold of the necessary resources and wherewithal to challenge
the existing hegemon—the dominant maritime power and system leader. That
is why, throughout history, the leading maritime power and system leader has
always played the leading role in checking and balancing against covetous states.
Likewise, once a country achieves hegemony of the Eurasian landmass core, it
has the ability to close off completely the continental market from the leading
maritime power. The latter has a vested interest in maintaining an open system,
requiring the political and economic doors of the system’s core region to stay
open for itself and its followers.4
In the case of America, modern technological developments have to a large
extent removed the possibility of being invaded. However, a hegemonic power
with control over Europe or East Asia can still threaten America’s leadership of
the international system. First, American values could not survive in a world in
which the United States was surrounded by a hostile and powerful environment,
since the challenge of hegemonic powers in Europe or East Asia could possibly
force America to become a “barracks” or “fortress” state.5 Second, American
freedom and prosperity necessarily rely on an open door to the core regions of
the world (especially Europe and East Asia), doors through which American
economy, politics, and culture can pass. But any hegemonic state on the Eurasian
continental core would be able to close off these regions completely.6 Preservation
of the balance of power of the Eurasian core region is therefore directly related
to the superiority of the leading maritime power and system leader; Britain once
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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saw maintenance of the balance of power system in Europe as one of its fundamental interests; so does America today, in both Europe and East Asia, including
the latter’s littoral seas.
It is for this reason that the United States today is vigilant to guard against
the rise of China, and not, largely, because China’s powerful expansion or the
growth of its naval forces substantially threatens American homeland security
or the safety of the sea-lanes. The possibility of the Chinese navy whipping the
American navy on high seas does not exist and will not into the foreseeable
future. American strategic apprehensions over China mainly revolve around
the consequences should the rise of China damage the balance of power on the
Eurasian landmass. The rapid rise of China’s economic, political, and military
might in the post–Cold War years, China’s natural superiority in continental East
Asia and on the East Asian littoral seas (within the first island chain), and the
increasingly serious imbalance of the East Asian regional system resulting from
the rise of China have become not only sticking points, structural contradictions,
between America and China but also the fundamental complicating forces in
relations between China and its maritime neighbors. This East Asian imbalance
also serves as a major reason for deep American concern over displays of China’s
naval power in recent years.7
All this means that America is concerned about the exponential development
of Chinese sea power in recent years not because China has the naval power to
compete effectively with America’s oceanic hegemony (or for command of the
seas within the first island chain) but because that development will greatly reduce America’s capability to meddle in the regional balance of power in East Asia
and its littoral seas. Such meddling is very crucial to the United States if it hopes
to prevent possibly military Chinese expansion and to preserve or solidify its own
hub-and-spoke alliance system in East Asia.8
If, however, for the purposes of strategic hedging, China begins operating in
Central Asia, not only will China’s economic influence in Central Asia rise, but
China will be enabled to obtain a magnitude of political sway in there. But even
if the proposed scheme smoothly comes to fruition, the consequences will be
nothing more than consolidation of China’s advantage on the continent; the imbalance of power on the Eurasian landmass—which America has always regarded
as its crucial national interest—will be even more severe.9
China’s move to consolidate its position in Eurasia and America’s desire to preserve the continental balance of power are not merely incompatible; actually, they
are diametrically opposed. In modern history, Napoleon’s France and Hitler’s
Germany, on the basis of the lessons from, respectively, the failures of maritime
expansion pursued by Louis XIV and Wilhelm II, turned to continental expansion, but the results were the same. The maritime consequences of a continental
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/5
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strategy toward Central Asia would in no way circumvent China’s deepening
strategic contradictions with America at sea; in fact, they might only accelerate
and deepen them. America’s overriding objective in East Asia in the post–Cold
War era has been to prevent China’s emergence as a continental and maritime
power able to challenge its own superiority in the western Pacific. Strategically,
America could contain Chinese expansion at sea while at the same time exerting
tremendous pressure on China’s vast land border, which would force China to
divert precious strategic resources to the defense of the border.10
At least in theory, if Sino-U.S. strategic contradictions deepen further, the
United States will likely adopt in the future certain measures toward China
similar to those once used against the Soviet Union—containing and weakening
China’s strength and influence through an array of allies along its lengthy periphery. These alliances, once established, will constitute an effective complement
to America’s bilateral alliance system in the Pacific Rim. In an important sense,
America’s worry is not China’s outward-oriented development; this type of development will only increase, not reduce, China’s dependence on, and integration
into, the international system dominated undoubtedly by the United States—one
of the principal goals of America’s China policy since the Richard Nixon presidency. Taking the long view, America’s concern over China’s future strategic orientation is that it will probably adopt a defensive position on the maritime front
while adopting aggressive policies on the mainland, thus establishing a relatively
closed sphere of influence into which America cannot project significant influence. In light of this, the American strategic focus will be fixated not merely on
preventing China’s expansion toward the sea (toward Southeast Asia) but also on
preventing China from expanding on the mainland. The latter form of strategic
defense in the future will likely require America to focus on powers and countries
adjacent to China, especially India, Russia, and the Central Asian states.
The Dual Character of the Heartland Power
The second problem inherent in the “hedging strategy” proposed by Professor
Gao is what the potential strategic impact of a continental strategy, with economic integration of the Eurasian landmass as the core, will be on already precarious
Sino-Russian relations. The key to the answer lies to a large extent in the dual
character, in terms of strategic orientation, of the “heartland power”—a concept
that has unfortunately been ignored or dismissed by most students and observers
of geostrategy in the postwar years.
As the continental power of the heartland, Russia has a dual strategic character. On the one hand, the Russians as the direct successors to the nomadic
grasslands people of the heartland occupy a unique geographical position that
has enabled them to apply enormous pressure on states on their periphery, by the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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actual or potential threat of territorial expansion. However, on the other hand, so
long as Russia does not intend to establish some form of hegemony over states on
its periphery, it is also the most effective guarantor of peace on the Eurasian continent.11 This dual character of Russia as the heartland power means that so long
as it eschews the dream of a Eurasian empire, Russia and the leading maritime
power should share similar, or even the same, primary strategic interests. This
point has been proved more than once in modern history; Russia itself, despite
longtime antagonism toward Britain previously and the United States since then,
has seldom clashed directly with the leading maritime power and system leader.12
Instead, throughout modern history Russia has always sought to make alliances
with Britain, and later the United States, to fight jointly against rimland challenger
states, including Napoleonic France and Wilhelm II’s and Hitler’s Germany,
which had struggled for the hegemony over the European continent. Given the
strategic character of Russia as the heartland power, it can be reasonably said that
the end of the Cold War and the continuing weakness of contemporary Russia
have largely restored the harmony of interest between the heartland power and
the United States, as the leading maritime power and system leader. The nexus
of this strategic uniformity is prevention of the rise of and any challenge from a
great power located on the rimland. Such a challenge would apply a great deal
of pressure not only on the United States but also, given its unique geostrategic
position, on Russia.
In fact, in its opposition to European integration and eastward expansion before and after the end of the Cold War, we can see Russia’s concerns. During the
Cold War there were two strands of thinking to the Soviet Union’s policy toward
Western Europe policy—opposition to America’s military presence in Western
Europe and to multifaceted integration tending to convert Western Europe into
an independent power center. In the context of the Cold War, that fact that these
two strands of thinking were separate was not obvious; after the Cold War, however, Russia’s opposition to the eastward expansion of the European Union and to
America were no longer linked, as they had been. The former exists essentially to
prevent the emergence of a unified Europe, with Russia left on the outside. This
policy does not involve hegemonic intentions but rather seeks to avoid a new type
of imbalance.13 Similarly, Russia is also vigilant against the post–Cold War rise
of an independent power center in East Asia. From the geostrategic perspective,
Central Asia and the Far East have significance for Russia equivalent to that of
Latin America for the United States. The Soviet Union’s policy toward Japan before and during World War II and, during the Cold War, its stationing of millions
of troops on the Sino-Soviet border in disregard of the tremendous cost vividly
illustrate Russia’s vigilance over the situation in the East Asian continent. With
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history in mind, it can be argued reasonably that Russia today should share some
of America’s worry at China’s rise. Given that Central Asia and the Far East have
always constituted Russia’s soft underbelly, the possible spillover effects inherent
in China’s tremendous population alone, regardless of other elements, would
represent a great potential challenge in Russian minds.14
Like European countries facing the Atlantic, China is a land/sea hybrid power,
with one side facing an open ocean and no insurmountable obstacle on its land
frontiers. This type of country usually faces a basic dilemma in terms of its
choice of strategic orientation—that is, whether toward land or toward sea. Such
countries, under pressure from both land and sea, are often exposed to a double
vulnerability. Since the Opium War in 1840, China has over the long term been
both weak and poor, to a large extent because pressure has come from both sea
and land. In the modern period, China has only twice temporarily escaped this
strategic dilemma—once during the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s, and again
since the 1990s and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The present reprieve has in
recent years made it possible for China to concentrate on developing a maritime
capability. From a macrohistorical perspective, it is of paramount, inestimable
importance for China to develop and maintain as cooperative a relationship with
Russia as possible, not only for China’s seaborne export-oriented economic development but also to avoid attack from both land and sea, because China faces
significant strategic pressure on the maritime front.
It is for this reason that the high-speed rail links integrating Eurasian economies to which Professor Gao refers may under no circumstances come at the
expense of the painstakingly reconstructed relations between China and Russia.
This point similarly means that for China to make inroads into Central Asia to
promote Eurasian economic integration without securing Russian support or at
least acquiescence carries great costs and risks. Also, the possibility of failure is
great. However, whether from a historical or practical point of view, it is difficult
to imagine Russia allowing China to make such significant inroads into Central
Asia; objectively speaking, the rise of Chinese influence in Central Asia will necessarily mean the reduction of Russia’s, even lessening the weight of Russia’s great
bargaining chip with China—energy.15 Russia may not have the wherewithal to
compete economically with China in Central Asia, but that certainly does not
mean that Russia will turn a proverbial blind eye to China in Central Asia. Strategically speaking, the meaning of Eurasian economic integration as proposed by
China is somewhat similar to that of America’s “Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership” to China. These two economic-integration schemes are both connected with transparent political ambitions and impacts. In view of this, it is easy
to imagine that if China really makes significant inroads into Central Asia, not
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only will Sino-Russian relations be complicated but there may be created between
China and Russia a climate of competition in Central Asia, whose results may
even involve some degree of Russo-American cooperation (though not deliberate) against China.
Empirical evidence provided by history suggests that mutual vulnerability between two continental powers is usually far greater than that between a
continental power and a maritime power. This point is intimately related to a
maritime country’s capability and interests.16 First, for reasons of tradition and
geography, maritime powers generally do not maintain strong armies, especially
in peacetime, and thus rarely pose threats to the survival of other great powers. Large armies massing on borders threaten—or simply have the potential to
threaten—the territorial integrity of other states in a way that naval power and
economic strength do not.17
Second, the key to the viability of America’s hegemonic position today is the
nation’s ability to maintain superiority in the leading economic, military, and
technological fields. But this type of superiority essentially cannot be maintained
through military means alone. Despite America’s ability to impose its will on
weaker states on some occasions, it is generally through means other than naked
military force. More importantly, in terms of capabilities, the United States can
hardly expect to coerce other great powers to conform to its will.18 Since the end
of the Cold War, despite unending difficulties, Sino-American relations have
shown considerable endurance and flexibility. This resilience is a product not
only of the two countries’ economic complementarities but also of their differences in capabilities and interests. Global powers usually have a greater range
of strategies for increasing their influence than solely coercive force. Such flexibility, however, does not exist between China and Russia. Not only do these two
countries lack economic complementarities, but their capabilities and interests
are surprisingly similar. Thus, Sino-Russian relations essentially are those of two
continental great powers.
A “Eurasian Union” and the Strategic Position of
Central Asia
The third problem of the strategic hedging to which Professor Gao refers relates
to the possible strategic impacts of China’s major push into Central Asia. First of
all we have to dispel a serious misunderstanding that has plagued China’s foreign
policy in recent years, regarding the political effects of economic development.
Since the policy of “reform and opening up,” China’s economy has maintained
high-speed growth. This growth not only provides a solid foundation for China’s
rise but serves as a powerful weapon of its foreign policy. It can be said that the
significant achievements of contemporary China’s foreign policy and the rapid
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/5

8

Zhengyu: Toward “Land” or toward “Sea”?

w u	
61

development of its economy are more or less intrinsically linked. However, there
are very few “one size fits all” truths in the world, and no policy in international
politics is effective in every situation. Rapid economic growth, with resulting
boom, has provided China with a powerful political lever in East Asia. However,
the political influence that can be sought through economic advantage is inherently limited, and once this limit is exceeded, efforts may actually be counterproductive. In recent years, the disparity between political relations and economic
links in East Asia (including Northeast and Southeast Asia) has vividly proved
this point. To some extent, it can be said that today East Asian countries’ strategic
and political dependence on the United States is largely aimed at offsetting the
political and strategic consequences, or even risks, of their economic dependence
on China.19 From this perspective, it can be reasonably expected that as economic
integration between East Asian countries and China deepens, their dependence
on China’s economy will deepen as well, and their political and strategic dependence on the United States will become increasingly serious.
To a large extent, this logic also applies to Central Asian countries—that if
China increases its economic penetration of Central Asia, that region’s countries
will likely, in the interest of maintaining political and strategic autonomy, opt to
strengthen strategic cooperation with other powers as a means of hedging against
political risks caused by economic dependence. That is to say, Chinese inroads
into the Central Asian region may probably create another instance of separation
between political relations and economic links. Strictly speaking, that separation,
which is now widespread in East Asia, does not come as a surprise; according to
the logic of an anarchical system, it is the normal reaction of weak countries facing strong and rising neighbors.20
From a strategic standpoint, China, being a “land/sea hybrid power,” at least in
theory, is likely to project its political and economic expansion in two directions
—one toward Southeast Asia, the other toward Central Asia. These two regions
are not merely increasingly reliant on China for economic well-being; more
importantly, since the end of the Cold War they have been marked by a kind of
power vacuum.
Southeast Asia’s power vacuum is at present being swiftly and effectively filled
by U.S. efforts to return Southeast Asia to the American embrace, along with
the constant expansion of two potential powers in the region, India and Japan—
although Southeast Asia and mainland China are culturally and economically
joined at the hip. In an important sense, this is the basic motivation underlying
America’s unrelenting efforts in recent years to stir up trouble and discontent in
Southeast Asia.21 Historically, in contrast, America’s influence in Central Asia
has been limited; this region has traditionally fallen within Russia’s sphere of influence. However, since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s persistent weaknesses
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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have created great political uncertainty in Central Asia. In some sense, the power
vacuum now existing there is not only favorable to the possible revitalization of
Islamic extremism in this area but also, given Central Asia’s abundant resources,
hugely tempting for China, which has been seeking all over the world the natural
resources necessary to maintain its high-speed economic development.22
Corresponding to America’s new rebalancing policy in Southeast Asia, Russia
is at present stepping up the pace of its own return to Central Asia. On 3 October 2011, in an article in Izvestia, Vladimir Putin, then the Russian premier,
proposed a “Eurasian Union.” On 18 November 2011 a formal agreement was
signed among Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan formally establishing a Eurasian
Union by 2015. Putin’s initiative is not purely economic; its political meaning is
very clear. A Eurasian Union formed along China’s northern border will resemble
the former Soviet Union as a political and economic entity. In this sense it will
be strikingly similar to America’s efforts in Southeast Asia in recent years, both
being strategic moves, almost identical in nature. This strategic move by Russia
to fill up the power vacuum in Central Asia means that Chinese pursuit of economic integration of the Eurasian landmass by a push into Central Asia would,
instead of offsetting the great pressure on the maritime front, probably stimulate
strongly unfavorable, even antagonistic, reactions from Russia. In fact, only a
basic understanding of the strategic implications of a Eurasian Union allows us
to understand why China cannot expect to achieve the so-called hedging goal by
pushing into Central Asia.23
Generally speaking, the Eurasian Union will have two negative consequences
for China: a serious constraint on access to energy from Central Asia and a substantial hollowing-out of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Contemporary China’s high-speed economic development has created a serious problem for it—increasing dependence on foreign sources of energy. The
Middle East is the principal source of imported energy today, but the political
situation in the region is complex, its countries have intimate ties to the United
States, and, even more importantly, control of the sea-lanes on which China’s
imported oil flows remains in American hands. All of this makes Central Asia
and Russia irreplaceable for China’s energy security. Once the Eurasian Union
as advocated by Russia comes to fruition, China will still wish to obtain energy
from Central Asia but will likely pay a much higher price than in the past. The
Sino-Russian energy game essentially hinges on Central Asian countries. So long
as China can access energy at a cheaper price from Central Asian countries than
from Russia, Russia will not be able to challenge China on the energy question.
But once Russia and Central Asian states take a united approach on energy issues,
the loser will be China.
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One of China’s great diplomatic achievements since “reform and opening up”
has been the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which
comprises China, Russia, and four Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. However, these Central Asian states are also all
designated members of the Eurasian alliance. It is not difficult to imagine that the
Eurasian Union, once formed, will not only seriously weaken China’s leading role
in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization but effectively empty the organization
of any substance. In an important sense, the Eurasian Union as advocated by Russia is essentially a strategic hedge against the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; from the Russian perspective, China’s leading role makes the organization a
vehicle through which China can increase its influence in Central Asia. The Eurasian Union agreement does not necessarily turn Russia into an enemy of China,
but it represents Russia’s preventive strategy against China’s rise and the ensuing
strategic ramifications. Thus, if China really attempts to integrate the Eurasian
economies by means of a high-speed railway, the project may not only produce a
new pattern of political and economic separation (政经分离) but may even turn
Central Asia into something of a new cold-war frontier.
Professor Gao’s proposition to the effect that China, given its land/sea hybrid
nature, enjoys much freedom of strategic choice implicitly assumes that the strategic contradiction now existing between America and Russia is irreconcilable.
However, in the 1970s China, on the basis of its perceived national interests,
could boldly break from the shackles of ideology to make an alignment with the
United States in a united front against the Soviet Union. It cannot be taken for
granted that in the future Russia and the United States will never stand together
in common interest against China.
The Path China’s Peaceful Development Should Take
As a land/sea hybrid power, China must pay close attention to two interrelated
problems in determining its long-term strategic development. First, as a hybrid
power, China has to strike an appropriate balance in the distribution of resources
between land and sea. Second, on the basis of the balance between the two strategic directions, China also must choose between land and sea as its own longterm, leading development direction.24
Compared to a landlocked or island country, a land/sea hybrid power like
China generally has certain obvious strategic weaknesses: one is the strategic
dilemma between facing toward the land and facing toward the sea; a second
is the dual pressure from both land and sea; third is the risk that resources to
serve the greater national strategy can be too easily dispersed. Over the past five
centuries, suffering from the unique weaknesses and constraints of a land/sea
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hybrid power, China missed several precious opportunities to develop itself into
a powerful, modern state. The safety and stability of its land boundary in the
post–Cold War period, allowing China to concentrate its energy and resources
on seaborne development, do not mean that its strategic vulnerabilities as a land/
sea hybrid power have absolutely disappeared, once and for all. In fact, to ensure
its long-term safety and security, China still has to find the appropriate balance
between land and sea. Most importantly, for a relatively long time China will have
to constrain its land-oriented activity to ensure stable relationships with neighboring powers, especially Russia.
China must establish on the basis of the land/sea balance its dominant direction of development. Modern historical experience has shown that land/sea hybrid powers, once achieving stability of their land borders, principally thereafter
focus their energy on sea-oriented development. The viability of this pathway
has already been proven in the past thirty years by the success of the “reform
and opening up” policy. Even if the high-speed rail ultimately brings about the
successful integration of Eurasian economies, the crucial point is that it cannot
replace the economic benefits and social impacts of sea-oriented development. In
terms of economic development, Eurasian economic integration cannot serve as
a vital substitute for China’s current multifaceted dependence on the markets of
developed countries, nor can it replace China’s dependence on the less developed
markets of Africa and Latin America. Within China, the social impacts of seaoriented development versus those of land-oriented development may be very
different. These two developmental directions in actuality relate to the rise and
fall of different social forces within China, in which one’s loss is another’s gain.
This win-lose scenario is crucial to the development of China’s domestic political
environment.
Indeed, China’s maritime-oriented development of recent years has encountered a series of major obstacles. These problems do not necessarily mean that
China should abandon its maritime-dominant development direction but rather
that it must optimize and improve the current development course as much as possible. One of the most significant issues in this regard is how to deal with outwardoriented development in light of dual pressures from the leading maritime great
power and from neighboring states. Throughout modern history, the rimland
powers that have attempted to pursue maritime transformation (especially
France under Louis XIV and Germany under Wilhelm II) have failed, to a large
extent because of the obvious common interest between the leading maritime
power and the neighboring countries in preventing the rise of a land/sea hybrid
power on the rimland.
The most important issue facing contemporary China’s outward-oriented
development is how to overcome pressure from neighboring states, exemplified
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/5
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clearly in the challenges China has endured in recent years in the East China
Sea and the South China Sea even though the Chinese government has repeatedly shown no intention of challenging the existing international order. This
argument relates to the global, not regional, balance of power, though the latter
is naturally the focal point of neighboring states. Strictly speaking, to dispel effectively suspicion and pressure from neighboring states, China should strive to
establish a series of regional institutions, with “all hands on deck” throughout the
process, not only taking the initiative in shaping a regionalized system binding
China and its neighbors but tolerating participation by outside powers (principally the United States). The reason for the latter point lies in the fact that without
the guarantees of extraregional powers, China simply cannot form any meaningful institutional mechanism with neighboring countries, especially second-level
powers and smaller states.
Another problem that contemporary China’s export-oriented development
needs to overcome is pressure from the leading maritime power and system
leader, namely, the United States. In addition to optimizing existing strategies,
when China responds to this type of pressure it must pay close attention to creating a truly open international order, regionalized and globalized, and taking
into consideration the historically formed core interests of the leading maritime
power and system leader. In short, one of the core interests of the leading maritime power and system leader lies in keeping the Eurasian core regions (especially Europe and East Asia) politically, economically, and culturally open to
itself as well as to its various allies and followers. Thus for the foreseeable future
China must not only tolerate the participation of the leading maritime power
and system leader in shaping the regional system but also establish a truly open
ideology. Only in this way can China effectively lessen, if not eliminate, the strategic distrust of its long-term intentions widely held by the United States and by
China’s neighboring states.
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